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The Appeal and Limits of
Constructivism1
T. M. Scanlon
In 1982, I wrote the following.
There is such a subject as moral philosophy for much the same reason that there is such a subject
as the philosophy of mathematics. In moral judgments, as in mathematical ones, we have a set of
putatively objective beliefs in which we are inclined to invest a certain degree of conﬁdence and
importance. Yet on reﬂection it is not at all obvious what, if anything, these judgments can be
about, in virtue of which some can be said to be correct or defensible and others not. This
question of subject matter, or the grounds of truth, is the ﬁrst philosophical question about both
morality and mathematics. Second, in both morality and mathematics it seems to be possible to
discover the truth simply by thinking or reasoning about it. Experience and observation may be
helpful, but observation in the normal sense is not the standard means of discovery in either
subject. So, given any positive answer to the ﬁrst question—any speciﬁcation of the subject
matter or ground of truth in mathematics or morality—we need some compatible epistemology
explaining how it is possible to discover the facts about this subject matter through something
like the methods we seem to use.2
I went on to say that in the case of morality there is also a third question: “Given any
candidate for the role of subject matter of morality, we must explain why anyone
should care about it.” I will call this the question of practical signiﬁcance: why we should
regard moral demands as ones we have strong reason to accept as guides to conduct.
In the case of normative truths, worries underlying the ﬁrst two questions I have
listed were famously stated by John Mackie. Stating a version of the question of subject
matter, Mackie wrote that, “if there were objective values, then they would be entities
or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the
universe.”3 And, addressing the epistemological question, he went on to say that if we
1 I am grateful to Peter Koellner and Charles Parsons for very helpful comments on an earlier version of
this paper.
2 Scanlon 1982, p. 104.
3 Mackie 1977, p. 38. In fairness to Mackie, I should emphasize that, like most people discussing these
issues at the time he was writing, he was concerned with morality, not with practical reasons more generally.
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were aware of these facts about such a subject matter “it would have to be by some
special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary
ways of knowing everything else.” He continued
When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of
the truth of these distinctively ethical premises or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical
pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the
framing and conﬁrming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or
conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; “a special
sort of intuition” is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clear-headed objectivist is
compelled to resort.4
I believe that Mackie states the question of subject matter in an overly metaphysical
way. In neither the case of mathematics nor that of the normative is it a problem that
facts about these domains would be different from facts about the natural world. There
is no reason to believe that the only truths are truths about the natural world. Nor is it
“incompatible with a scientiﬁc view of the world” (i.e. that world) to maintain that
there are such truths.5
Even if this is so, however, there remain important questions about the subject
matter of mathematics and that of morality and of the normative more generally,
questions that an account of these domains should answer. These are, ﬁrst, questions
about whether these subject matters can be characterized in a way that justiﬁes
conﬁdence that claims about them have determinate truth-values. Second, there is
the question of in what sense truths about these domains are “independent of us.”
Third, there is the epistemological question of how it is possible for us to come to
know truths about the subject so characterized. This is not a problem of explaining
how we can be in touch with strange entities, but rather a question of determining
what methods of ﬁrst-order reasoning about that subject matter should be seen as valid.
Finally, in the case of morality there is the question of practical signiﬁcance—the
problem of explaining the importance that moral truths have for us.
When he speaks of claims about objective values, he may intend to contrast these with claims about
“subjective” values—claims about what a person ought to do, or has reason to do, that, unlike moral claims,
are claimed to hold only insofar as the agent has certain desires or aims. Mackie may have no objection to
values, or claims about reasons, of the latter kind. If so, however, his position suffers certain instability. The
claim that a person has reason to do what will promote the satisfaction of his or her desires is itself a normative
claim. Indeed, it is an “objective” normative claim, since it does not itself depend on what people desire, or on
what aims they have. If there is something metaphysically odd about objective normative truths, then this
supposed truth (that people have reason to do what would satisfy their desires, or promote their aims) is just as
odd as any other. The disagreement between someone who thinks that all reasons for action depend on the
agent’s desires and someone who thinks that there are some reasons that do not depend on agents’ desires is a
normative disagreement, not a metaphysical one. So Mackie’s “argument from queerness,” insofar as the
queerness involved is metaphysical, is an argument against irreducibly normative truths of any kind, not just
objective moral values. At least this is how I am going to take his argument, I hope not unfairly.
4 Ibid., p. 39.
5 I argue for these claims in my 2009 John Locke Lectures, Scanlon, forthcoming.
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Many of these questions could, I believe, be satisfactorily answered by a sufﬁciently
clear characterization of the subject matter of a domain in ﬁrst-order terms—that is, in
the terms used by ordinary statements in that domain. The subject matter of arithmetic,
for example, is adequately characterized by saying that it includes zero and all and only
those other numbers reached from zero by repeated applications of the successor
function. This characterization seems evidently true and non-arbitrary. Since the
truth-values of arithmetical statements are determined, ultimately, by facts about the
successor relation, this characterization supports the idea that arithmetical statements
have determinate truth-values (unless this description of an inﬁnite domain is seen as
unintelligible). We are capable of thinking about and comparing particular ﬁnite strings
in this sequence, S0, SS0 . . . so it is not mysterious how we can arrive at basic truths of
arithmetic “just by thinking about them.” Moreover, on the basis of this characteriza-
tion of the domain, we can recognize as true more general axioms (such as Peano’s
postulates), which can then be used to establish general theorems about numbers.
Go¨del’s results show that any set of axioms, if consistent, will leave some sentences
undecided, but this does not mean that the sentences that are undecidable in a
particular axiom system have no determinate truth-value.
This is in contrast with the situation in set theory, where there is at present no fully
satisfactory general characterization of the domain of sets. This domain might be
characterized in two ways. The ﬁrst is through sets of axioms, such as those of
Zermelo–Frankel set theory (ZF). But even if these axioms are plausible and, as far as
we can see, consistent, they may seem arbitrary in the absence of some general
characterization of the realm of sets that they describe, and which supports them in
the way in which our intuitive understanding of the natural numbers supports the
Peano postulates.
One such characterization is provided by what is called the iterative conception of
set.6 According to this conception, the universe of sets consists of just those that would
be formed in the following process: Begin, at stage 0, with a ﬁnite list of speciﬁed
elements (or with the empty set). At stage n + 1 form all sets of the basic elements and
the sets that were created at previous stages. For each limit ordinal l, at stage l form the
set of all sets formed at stage a for all a<l. The iterative conception provides a rationale
for most of the standard axioms of accepted set theory. As I have stated it, the account is
vague or incomplete in a number of ways. First, it appeals at various points to the idea
of “all sets” “formed” at previous stages, and these ideas seem to need further speciﬁ-
cation.7 Second, it remains unspeciﬁed how far the construction extends (through “all”
of the transﬁnite ordinals?).
6 On this conception and the adequacy of the basis it provides for axioms of set theory, see Shoenﬁeld
1977; Boolos 1971; Parsons 1983; and Boolos 1989.
7 As Parsons notes (Parsons 1983), there are also questions about how the idea of “earlier and later” in the
sequence is to be understood.
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The more serious problem, however, is that neither this conception nor the axioms
of ZF seem to give a complete characterization of the realm of sets. Important questions
are left open, such as the status of the continuum hypothesis—the question of whether
there are transﬁnite sets that are larger than the set of all natural numbers but smaller
than the set of all sets of natural numbers. To resolve this question, and others, we need
a further characterization of the realm of sets. This might be provided by additional
axioms, or by augmenting the description offered by the iterative conception. This
might be done by changing the starting point—beginning with something other than
the empty set—or by redeﬁning the steps through which the hierarchy proceeds.
Ideally, one would want to do both: to ﬁnd additional axioms that are supported by an
augmented version of this hierarchical process.
These additional axioms, and the characterization supporting them, would be
justiﬁed by its ability to unify and explain what seem to be the most evident truths
about sets. As Kurt Go¨del famously observed:
There might exist axioms so abundant in their veriﬁable consequences, shedding so much light
on a whole ﬁeld, and yielding such powerful methods for solving problems . . . that, no matter
whether they are intrinsically necessary, they would have to be accepted at least in the same sense
as a well-established physical theory.8
It appears that the ultimate form of justiﬁcation here is a process like what Rawls called
the method of reﬂective equilibrium: we look for general principles that unify and
explain what seem to us to be the most evident truths about a subject matter, being
ready along the way to change our mind about these “evident truths” when we learn
more about what general principles would be required to explain them.9 So, for
example, we might be led to change our mind about the continuum hypothesis
when we discover that it can only be supported by additional axioms that have other
consequences that are very implausible. As Rawls said about the search for principles of
justice:
Moral philosophy is Socratic: we may want to change our present considered judgments once
their regulative principles are brought to light. And we may want to do this even though these
principles are a perfect ﬁt. A knowledge of these principles may suggest further reﬂections that
lead us to revise our judgments.10
We may hope that this process of seeking reﬂective equilibrium will lead to a set of
axioms and a general characterization of the realm of sets that ﬁt together in a
satisfactory way. This would not be a metaphysical account of the subject matter of
set theory: it would proceed entirely in ﬁrst-order terms, employing the concept of a
set. Despite this, such an account would support the idea that set theory has a
8 Go¨del 1964, p. 477.
9 See Rawls 1971, sec. 9 and “The Independence of Moral Theory” in Rawls 1999.
10 Rawls 1971, p. 49.
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determinate subject matter, and that statements about sets have determinate truth-
values, removing the sense that the choice of set theoretic axioms is arbitrary. But it
remains possible that this process will not lead to any single overall account of the realm
of sets but instead to several alternative accounts shaped by different additional axioms.
In this case a kind of pluralism about set theory may be correct: there may be alternative
characterizations of the domain of sets between which it is open to us to choose.11
The case of morality is in some important respects analogous to that of set theory in
this regard: we lack a single convincing overall ﬁrst-order characterization of the
subject matter of morality (analogous to the characterization of the natural numbers).
The search for such a characterization must proceed by the method of reﬂective
equilibrium, but this method may not yield a single determinate answer. Indeed, the
situation of morality seems worse than in that of set theory in one important respect:
the concepts in question cannot be characterized with sufﬁcient precision to provide a
rigorous account of the methods of reasoning that we employ in carrying out the
search for reﬂective equilibrium.
I have so far been considering the advantages that could be gained from a compre-
hensive characterization of the subject matter of a domain in purely ﬁrst-order terms:
by means of general claims about numbers, about sets, or about what is morally right
and wrong. Let me now turn to the idea that such an account might be constructivist.
A constructivist account, in the sense in which I will be using that term, characterizes a
domain in terms of some speciﬁed process of construction. This can take many
different forms. The process in question may involve ways of constructing objects in
the domain of a particular kind—for example, a way of constructing a number a such
that Fa or a general way, given a number, b, of constructing a number a such that Rba.
But since the result of such a construction is always to establish the correctness of some
statement about the domain, such as “Fa,” or “∃xFx,” or “Rba” or “(x)∃yRxy,” we
can think of the constructions not as ways of constructing objects but as ways of
establishing particular claims about a domain. This will be a constructivist account of
the domain (rather than merely a set of general truths about that domain) only if it is
plausible to think that what makes something a truth about the domain in question is
that it can be arrived at through steps of the kind in question.
A constructivist account will be interesting only if it speciﬁes clearly which se-
quences of steps constitute a construction (or derivation) of the appropriate kind.
Deciding whether a given step is of an appropriate kind may involve an exercise of
judgment. But (and this is the point that justiﬁes this seeming digression) the judgment
that is called for cannot be a judgment directly about the truth of some claim about the
domain in question, or about what seems most likely to be true about this domain.
A procedure that involves judgments of this kind may be a way of arriving at justiﬁed
11 A possibility described in Koellner 2010.
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beliefs about a domain. But such a process could not be what determines the facts about
that domain itself.
It follows that the process of seeking a set of beliefs about a subject that are in
reﬂective equilibriummay be a way of arriving at a characterization of the subject matter
of a domain, but it is not an account of that subject matter itself, and, in particular, not a
constructivist account. This is because that process—identifying those statements about
the subject that seem most clearly true, formulating general principles that would
account for those truths, then going through successive steps of modifying judgments
and principles to ﬁnd ones that ﬁt together properly—requires repeated judgments
about the domain in question.
In the case of mathematics, the term ‘constructivist’ is generally used in a sense that is
more limiting than the one I am here concerned with. The appeal of accounts that are
constructivist in this sense lies in concern about characterizations of a domain in terms
of a “completed inﬁnite” such as “the set containing 0 and closed under successor.” It
may be held that we cannot grasp the idea of such a set, and perhaps even that this
description does not identify a determinate domain. Doubts of this kind lead people to
seek an account according to which the facts about numbers are facts about what has
been or could actually be arrived at by us through certain speciﬁed means of construc-
tion. This leads to a different view of the methods of valid reasoning about numbers,
and to the conclusion that statements about numbers may not all have determinate
truth-values, since for a given A there may be no construction leading to A and yet no
construction leading to not-A.
Things are different in the case of morality, because the source of doubts about this
domain is different. A characterization of the subject matter of morality consisting
simply of very general ﬁrst-order principles of right and wrong may seem unsatisfactory
for a variety of reasons. Insofar as these principles are claimed to be true independent of
us, one may want some explanation of what kind of facts these are. This problem is
sharpened by the problem of practical signiﬁcance. If moral truths are truths about a
domain of facts independent of us, why should we take these facts to be signiﬁcant,
even authoritative, as guides to conduct? If moral truths were true in virtue of facts
about us, such as our preferences, or our wills, then their practical signiﬁcance for us
could be readily explained. But if they are objective truths, independent of us, then it
may well be asked why we should care about them. This fundamental tension between
objectivity and practical signiﬁcance was a central element in Mackie’s challenge: what
he expressed skepticism about was the possibility of facts “in the world” that had what
he called “objective prescriptivity.”
Some constructivist accounts of morality are appealing because they seem well
positioned to respond to this problem. To see why, consider ﬁrst the account offered
by John Rawls, who was the ﬁrst to introduce the term “constructivism” in this area.12
12 In Rawls 1980 and Rawls 1993, Lecture III,“Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” and Political
Liberalism, Chapter III, “Political Constructivism.”
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Rawls was concerned not with morality in general but with justice, that is to say,
principles for the assessment of basic social institutions. The function of such principles,
he believed, is to serve as a shared basis for assessing conﬂicting claims from citizens
about what their institutions should be like. The main conﬂicts of this kind will be
between individuals in different economic classes and between individuals who have
different religious views or, more generally, different “conceptions of the good.” So
principles appropriate for this role will need to be justiﬁed on a basis that is neutral with
respect to these forms of disagreement. Rawls suggested that this would true of
principles that would be agreed to by parties who did not know what economic
class they represented or what conception of the good they held. He made this idea
more precise in his idea of an Original Position in which principles of justice are
chosen.13
The resulting view, that the correct principles of justice are ones that would be
agreed to by parties in the Original Position Rawls described, has the form of a
constructivist view: facts about justice are facts about what principles would be arrived
at through a process of a certain kind. Even though Rawls deﬁnes his Original Position
quite clearly, deciding what principles of justice would or could be chosen in such a
position requires the exercise of judgment. (This is an important contrast with the case
of set theory.) But the account remains constructivist because the judgments in
question are not judgments about what is just or unjust (or morally right or wrong)
but rather judgments about what individuals who are seeking only to do as well for
themselves as they can would have reason to choose under conditions of limited
knowledge.
The case for accepting this constructivist account of justice lies with a reﬂective
equilibrium argument. The account has to be defended by claiming that it “ﬁts with”
and provides a satisfying explanation of what are, on reﬂection, our considered
judgments about justice.14 These include judgments “of all levels of generality”—
judgments about the justice or injustice of particular institutions and practices, maxims
stating prima facie just- or unjust-making characteristics, and judgments about the
nature and role of justice itself.15
The fact that certain principles would be chosen through a procedure of the kind
Rawls described gives us reason to be concerned with them because it indicates that
they have the kind of impartial justiﬁcation that makes them ﬁt to play the role that
principles of justice are supposed to play. This is only a partial explanation, since it can
always be asked what reason we have to be concerned with impartial justiﬁcations of
this kind. The answer is given, I believe, by pointing to the character that our relations
13 Rawls 1971, Chapter III.
14 “On reﬂection” because the relevant class of judgments is not ﬁxed at the start. Our assessment of which
judgments are “considered” is likely to change as the process of seeking principles that explain these
judgments goes forward. For more discussion, see Scanlon 2002, my “Rawls on Justiﬁcation.”
15 See Rawls 1951; Rawls 1971, sec. 9; and Rawls 1975. For further discussion see Scanlon 2002.
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with our fellow citizens have if we are cooperating with them on principles that have
such a justiﬁcation, compared with the character of these relations when our institu-
tions cannot be justiﬁed in this way. The force of this appeal can, of course, be debated
further (every justiﬁcation has to start somewhere). But the fact that it can be supported
by this explanation takes the constructivist account beyond what is offered by a ﬁrst-
order account that takes the form simply of general principles specifying what justice
requires.
This constructivist account also offers an explanation of the objectivity of claims
about justice—the sense in which they are correct or incorrect “independent of us.”
To assess this explanation we should consider ﬁrst the various ways in which the idea of
independence can be understood.
The ﬁrst is the idea that a subject matter is “independent of us,” and judgments
about it are objective, if it is possible for us (at least individually) to be mistaken in our
judgments about it. Call this minimal objectivity judgment-independence. Truths of
arithmetic and set theory are objective in this sense. Why do I believe that they are?
Because there are ways of thinking about these questions which anyone who under-
stands the subject can engage in, and which seem to lead clearly to certain conclusions.
These “ways of thinking” need not be algorithms, although in the case of arithmetic
they often are. More informal methods—such as those we use to convince ourselves of
many of the axioms of set theory—can sufﬁce. This minimal objectivity (judgment-
independence) is not just a matter of de facto agreement, but also the tendency of the
judgments of different competent judges to converge, and the stability of our own
judgments, which supports our conﬁdence that they concern judgment-independent
truths. It is important, for example, that there is such a thing as discovering errors in our
thinking, and that when we have identiﬁed something as an error this conclusion is
generally stable—we do not generally ﬂip back the other way.
Judgment-independence is an important property, but it is a quite minimal notion of
objectivity. Even judgments about what is the case according to a make-believe game
can be objective in this sense, as can judgments about what is permitted by certain
social norms. But these things are not “independent of us” in at least one of the senses
that we have in mind in discussing objectivity.
A second, stronger idea is that a subject matter is independent of us, and judgments
about it are objective, if these judgments are minimally objective and, in addition, the
standards for assessing such judgments do not depend on what we have done, chosen,
or adopted, and would not be different had we done, chosen, or adopted something
else. I will call this choice-independence. Judgments about what one has reason to do in a
make-believe game and judgments about what one has to do given arbitrary social
norms are judgment-independent but not choice-independent. To be clear: judgments
about what is true within such a game, or what is required by a social norm, can be both
judgment-independent and choice-independent. What are not choice-independent
are judgments about what one has reason to do or believe that presuppose these games
or norms.
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Many mathematical judgments, such as propositions of number theory and arithmetic,
are objective in both of these senses. Many axioms of set theory (such as the standard
Zermelo–Frankel axioms) are choice-independent as well as judgment-independent.
But if “pluralism” of the kind mentioned earlier turns out to be correct then there are
further axioms of set theory that are not choice-independent.
I believe that many judgments about reasons for action are both judgment-
independent and choice-independent, although there is disagreement about whether
this is so. But even if judgments about reasons are independent of us in both of these
senses they are not “independent of us” in the further sense of being independent of
what we are like. This might be called independence of human nature. If we were
constituted or situated differently, so as to have different needs, or so as to enjoy
different things, then our reasons would be different. In the case of reasons, lack of
independence in this sense does not seem to be a problem. One would not expect or
want them to be independent of our nature in this way. (Mathematical truths, on the
other hand, might be expected to have this kind of independence, although it is an
interesting question how it would matter if they lacked it.)
What does seem clear, however, is that the signiﬁcance of mathematical truths does
not depend on their being independent of us in any further, distinctively ontological
sense of having a real existence apart from us. Facts about physical objects do need to
have such an existence. But there is, I believe, no reason to construe mathematical
truths on this model.
According to Rawls’s constructivist account, judgments about justice are objective
in the sense of being judgment-independent if judgments about what parties in Rawls’s
Original Position have reason to choose, and judgments about what follows from those
principles, are judgments we can be mistaken about. This seems quite plausible.
Judgments about what the parties in the Original Position would have reason to
choose are normative judgments. But their objectivity is less controversial than that
of many normative judgments, because they are only hypothetical normative judg-
ments—judgments about what parties have reason to do given certain speciﬁed aims
and given certain background information. These judgments are in this respect like the
judgments I mentioned above, such as judgments about games or social norms, which
have judgment-independence but lack choice-independence. This is not, however, a
ﬂaw from the point of view of the aims of a constructivist theory.
As I said earlier, the appeal of a constructivist theory lies in the promise of giving an
account of a subject matter that supports the idea that judgments about it have
determinate truth-values and that provides or ﬁts with a plausible account of the
practical signiﬁcance of such judgments. The fact that, on such an account, the
determinate truth-value of judgments about justice depends on the choice of a
particular way of deﬁning the Original Position is not a problem if the fact that a
principle would be arrived at in an Original Position of that kind is a reason for us to
give that principle the authority claimed for principles of justice.
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A claim that being chosen in such an Original Position is a reason to regard a
principle as authoritative is an unconditional normative claim about what we have
reason to do in the relevant circumstances, hence more controversial than the condi-
tional claims about what parties in the Original Position would have reason to choose,
given their aims and the information available to them. But this should not undermine
the determinateness of judgments about justice on this constructivist account, even for a
person who has doubts about the objectivity of unconditionally normative judgments.
What we have, then, is a two-part thesis: an account of the truth-values of judgments
about justice, which depends only on conditional normative claims, and an account of
the signiﬁcance of such judgments, which depends on claims about reasons whose
objectivity may be more controversial.
Any suggestion of arbitrariness ﬂowing from the dependence of the truth-values of
judgments about justice on the choice of a particular way of deﬁning the Original
Position would be further reduced, or even eliminated, I would say, if a larger
reﬂective equilibrium argument establishes that the account of justice provided by
this deﬁnition is the one that best ﬁts with all of our considered judgments about
justice. (It is exactly the lack of such an argument that could lead to a “pluralist” view of
set theory.)
My own contractualist account of moral right and wrong could also count as a
constructivist account (in this case, an account of individual morality).16 According to
this account, in order to determine whether an action is morally permissible we should
consider a general principle that would permit it. We then consider what objections
individuals in various situations could offer to this principle based on the way in which
they would be affected by it, by living with the consequences of the actions it would
permit and with the possibility that agents may perform such actions, since they would
be permitted to do so. We then compare these reasons with the reasons that individuals
would have to object to a principle that would forbid actions of the kind in question,
based, again, on how they would be affected by such a principle, and consider whether
it would be reasonable for those who have reason to object to the principle permitting
the action to reject it, given the reasons that others have for objecting to the contrary
principle. If it would be reasonable to reject that principle, then the action in question
would be morally wrong. The rightness or wrongness of an action depends on what the
correct outcome of this procedure would be, whether or not anyone has carried it out.
Like Rawls’s constructivist account of judgments about justice, this account of the
subject matter of moral rightness and wrongness makes the truth-values of judgments
about this subject matter depend on facts about what principles individuals in certain
circumstances would have reason to reject. It then explains the practical signiﬁcance of
judgments about right and wrong on the ground that we have reason to care about
principles that could not be rejected in this way—speciﬁcally, that we have reason to
16 See Scanlon 1998, Chapters 4, 5.
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care about this kind of justiﬁability of our actions to others. The case for accepting this
account of rightness and wrongness then depends, as before, on a reﬂective equilibrium
argument that it provides the best overall account of our considered judgments about
this subject matter, including, as before, judgments “of all levels of generality,” not just
judgments about the rightness and wrongness of particular actions.
On this account, judgments of right and wrong will have a particular form of
objectivity—will be judgment-independent or choice-independent—just in case
judgments about what individuals in certain circumstances have reason to reject have
these forms of objectivity. In contrast to Rawls’s constructivist account of justice, in this
case the judgments on which the truth-values and objectivity of moral judgments are
made to depend are fully normative judgments about reasons for action. They are
judgments about what individuals in speciﬁed circumstances who, among other things,
care about ﬁnding principles others could also accept, would have reason to do. But the
judgments that are called for involve judgments about which things individuals have
more reason to want to have, or to avoid. Since someone like Mackie, who has doubts
about the objectivity of moral judgments is likely to have doubts about the objectivity
of judgments about reasons for action in general, this brings us to the general question
of how the determinateness and objectivity of judgments of the latter kind can be
explained and defended. In particular, it raises the question of whether a constructivist
view might provide a satisfactory account of the subject matter of normative judgments
in general.
Such an account would involve a process for “constructing” reasons—that is, for
arriving at conclusions about whether a given consideration is or is not a reason for a
person in certain circumstances to act in a certain way—such that there are determinate
standards for the validity of steps involved in this process. Moreover, for reasons
mentioned above, the validity of these steps cannot depend on the truth of claims
about which things are or are not reasons for action.
If such an account of reasons for action is to have ambitions parallel to those of
constructivist accounts of justice and moral rightness and wrongness, the fact that the
conclusion that P is a reason for a person in C to do A can be arrived at through this
process should help to explain the practical signiﬁcance of a claim that P is a reason. In
this case, however, it is not clear what is to be explained. The practical signiﬁcance of
judgments about justice or about moral right and wrong can be seen as lying in the fact
that when such a judgment is correct then we have reason to be guided by it in deciding
what to do. So in these cases practical signiﬁcance can be explained in terms of reasons.
But where judgments about reasons for action are concerned this is not an option. It is
nonsensical to ask what reason we have to do what we have reason to do. So if the
practical signiﬁcance of judgments about reasons is to be explained this must take some
other form.17 Finally, if a constructivist account of reasons for action is to be supported
17 For fuller discussion of this question see Scanlon, forthcoming, Lecture 1.
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in reﬂective equilibrium, it should seem evident that at least those judgments about
reasons that seem most clearly correct are ones that could be arrived at through the
procedure that this account describes.
Although I think that constructivist accounts of justice and morality have some
plausibility, I do not believe that a plausible constructivist account of reasons for action
in general can be given. In the remainder of this chapter I will try to explain why.
The best-known attempt to provide such a view is what has come to be called Kant’s
Categorical Imperative procedure.18 Kant’s Categorical Imperative is a test of the
acceptability of maxims, which I will take to be general policies of taking certain
considerations as reason to act in certain ways. A maxim passes the Categorical
Imperative test if it can be willed to be a universal law or if adopting it is consistent
with regarding rational nature (whether one’s own or that of another rational creature)
as an end in itself. This is commonly understood as a test of the moral acceptability of a
maxim, and of acting on such a maxim. So understood, it seems too weak to provide
a general account of reasons for action since, presumably, it can be permissible for a
person to do things that, as it happens, he or she has no reason to do. In Korsgaard’s
version of the Kantian account, this gap is ﬁlled by the idea of an agent’s practical
identities. A practical identity is “a description under which you value yourself and ﬁnd
your life worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. Conceptions of
practical identity include such things as roles and relationships, citizenship, member-
ships in ethnic or religious groups, causes, vocations, professions, and ofﬁces.”19
The overall idea is this: insofar as we see ourselves as acting at all, we must see the
Categorical Imperative as constraining our practical thought. So we have the reasons
speciﬁed by the maxims that this requires us to adopt. Beyond this, we have reasons to
do those things that are required by the more speciﬁc practical identities we have
adopted, provided that these are compatible with the Categorical Imperative. This
view can be seen as constructivist insofar as it provides a procedure through which it is
determined whether something is a reason for a person: something is a reason for a
person if denying that it was a reason would violate the Categorical Imperative or be
inconsistent with some practical identity (consistent with the Categorical Imperative)
that that person has adopted.20 The fact that valid judgments about reasons arise from
this process is supposed to explain their practical signiﬁcance: their special authority lies
in the agent’s own will—in the fact that they ﬂow from choices the agent has made or
from an identity that an agent must endorse insofar as she sees herself as acting at all.
According to this account, judgments about reasons are objective in the sense of
being judgment-independent: they are the kind of thing that someone can be mistaken
18 See Korsgaard 1996; O’Neill 1989.
19 Korsgaard 2009, p. 20.
20 This account could also be seen as constructivist insofar as it holds that we construct the domain or
reasons by adopting particular ends and practical identities, in ways consistent with the Categorical Impera-
tive. This seems to me entirely consistent with the version stated in the text so I will not explore it separately.
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about. Some judgments about reasons—those following from the Categorical Impera-
tive itself—are also choice-independent. The reasons ﬂowing from the choices of
practical identity that the agent has made will not be choice-independent. Whether
this is a ﬂaw in the account, or an advantage, is something to be determined by the
process of seeking reﬂective equilibrium in our overall judgments about reasons. It is
quite plausible to say that some reasons a person has depend on prior choices he or she
has made. The question is when this is true and how this dependence is best explained.
I cannot here give a full examination of the Kantian theory, which is subtle and
complex, but will just state brieﬂy my reasons for ﬁnding it unsatisfactory.21 First,
despite the initial appeal of various forms of Kant’s Categorical Imperative as moral
requirements, I am not convinced by any arguments I have seen for the claim that we
must see these requirements as binding on us insofar as we see ourselves as acting at all.
Second, although it seems true that individuals have different reasons depending on the
ends and practical identities they have adopted, these reasons depend on their having
good reasons to adopt those ends or identities in the ﬁrst place, and not to revise or
reject them. And these reasons in turn are not all adequately explained by the
Categorical Imperative test.
If the Kantian constructivist account of reasons is not satisfactory, is there another
constructivist account that would be more satisfactory? Part of the appeal of the
Kantian account is that it not only promises to provide grounding for the correctness
of judgments about reasons but also promises to do this in a way that explains the
practical signiﬁcance of these judgments. It attempts to do this by grounding facts about
reasons in a conception of rationality. So one question is whether there might be a
different conception of rationality that could play this grounding role. This would have
to be a conception that did not itself involve or depend on substantive claims about
what reasons people have, but which led to conclusions about such claims. I do not
myself see what such a conception could be like. Some things that are referred to as
conceptions of rationality are very general substantive theses about reasons—such as the
idea that it is rational for a person to do what is in his or her self-interest. Such an
account could not serve as an explanation of the practical signiﬁcance of these reasons.
The only non-substantive alternative that I am aware of is the formal conception of
rationality discussed by John Broome and others, according to which rational require-
ments are simply requirements of consistency among a person’s practical attitudes.22
These requirements have no substantive implications about the reasons people have. So
no account of either of these kinds would provide a basis for claims about reasons.
It is possible, however, that there might be a constructivist account of reasons of a
less ambitious kind. Such an account would keep the ambition of characterizing the
domain of reasons in a way that supported the idea that judgments about reasons have
determinate truth-values. But it would abandon the further aim of explaining the
21 For slightly fuller discussion see Scanlon 2011.
22 See Broome 1999, 2005; Kolodny 2005.
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practical signiﬁcance of conclusions about reasons, resting simply with the idea that the
“normative authority” of a reason is simply that—being a reason—and that this cannot
be explained any further way. Such an account would be similar to the “constructivist”
account of sets offered by the Iterative Conception. This account characterizes the
universe of sets by describing the way in which sets are constructed out of sets or non-
set elements. But it is stated in the language of set theory, and does not claim to explain
what a set is. Might there, then, be a constructivist account of reasons of this more
modest kind?
It does seem that some reasons depend on others. Roughly speaking, it seems that if
a person has good reason to have a certain end, then he or she has good reason to do
what will promote it, and if a person has good reason to hold a certain value, or to
adopt a particular practical identity, then he or she has good reason to do what is
involved in respecting this value or living in accord with this identity.23 One might say,
then, that these relations of dependence between reasons are ways in which the domain
of reasons is determined, by the construction of some reasons on the basis of others.
The problem, however, is that there seem to be too many seemingly independent
reasons that are not constructed from others in this way. To refer again to the analogy
with set theory, the question would be what is to play the role here analogous to the
empty set, or a small set of prior elements from which the domain of sets may be seen as
constructed. One proposal might be that the only underived reasons are reasons to
avoid pain and seek pleasure, and that all other reasons are constructed out of these in
ways like those just described. This does not seem to me a very plausible proposal,
because it does not seem that these are the only underived reasons. And this conclusion
points toward a more general one: the domain of reasons, even reasons for action,
seems too varied and complex to be plausibly analyzed in this way.
How, then, do we come to know particular underived truths about which things are
reasons? My own answer is that we do this simply by thinking carefully about what
seem to us to be reasons, considering what general principles about reasons would
explain them, what implications these would have, considering the plausibility of the
implications of these principles and so on. For example, suppose it seems to me that
someone has reason to do A because he or she would ﬁnd it pleasant. Pleasure does not
always constitute a reason (pleasure in the suffering of others, for example, does not).
So we need to ask what attitudes this particular pleasure involves, and whether they are
attitudes that one has reason to want, or reason to want in the particular circumstances
in question.
One might characterize this process as one of bringing one’s particular judgments
about reasons and one’s general principles about when something is a reason into
reﬂective equilibrium. This seems to me broadly correct, although misleading in some
ways, of which I have space here to mention only a few.
23 Exactly how this is so is a complicated matter. See Raz 2005 and Kolodny ms.
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The ﬁrst is that the distinction between particular judgments and general principles
that explain them is in this case not clear. As I mentioned earlier in discussing pain, the
process I have just described is one of coming to a clearer understanding of the
conditions, c, under which some fact p is a reason. So it is as much a matter of clarifying
what particular judgment we in fact accept, as a matter of ﬁnding a separate principle
that “explains” this judgment. Second, the label “equilibrium” is misleading insofar as
it suggests that one’s reasons for accepting the judgments one holds at the end of the
process include the fact that one has achieved an “equilibrium” or “coherence” among
one’s various beliefs.24 The problem with this is that mere coherence is too easily
achieved—one could attain it in many ways, simply by rejecting one or another set of
conﬂicting judgments. The justiﬁcatory force of the judgments we arrive at lies, rather,
in the details of the process that leads to these judgments. The reason for accepting one
of these judgments is that (as far as one can tell) it entails other judgments that are true,
or is supported by judgments that lead to such conclusions. ( Just as, in the case of set
theory, one has reason to accept a new axiom because it supports or is supported by and
uniﬁes other set theoretic claims that appear to be correct.)
These factors being noted, it seems to me that such a process of careful reﬂection is
the only way we have of arriving at conclusions about reasons for action. Might this
process itself be seen as a constructivist account of the domain of reasons? Sharon Street,
for example, speaks of “a constructivist view according to which the truth of ‘X is a
reason for agent A to Y ’ is a function of whether that judgment would be among A’s
evaluative judgments in reﬂective equilibrium.”25
There are several problems with this proposal. First, it is not plausible to claim that if
the judgment that X is a reason for A to Y would be among A’s evaluative beliefs in
reﬂective equilibrium then X is a reason for A to Y however A carried out the process of
reaching this equilibrium. There are many lazy and sloppy ways of reaching equilibrium.
As I just pointed out, the normative status conferred by a judgment’s being in a set that
is in reﬂective equilibrium depends on the quality of the decisions that are made in
arriving at it—decisions about what to count as a considered judgment at the outset and
about what to modify in situations of conﬂict. So the most that could be said is that X is
a reason for A to Y if the judgment that it is such a reason would be among A’s
evaluative judgments in reﬂective equilibrium if the judgments A made in arriving at this
equilibrium were sound. So understood, however, this is not a constructivist view, since
the steps involved in carrying out the process in question would involve making
judgments about what is or is not a reason.
Leaving aside the question of the applicability of the label “constructivist,” however,
it is true for the same reason that the process of seeking reﬂective equilibrium in one’s
beliefs about reasons is not an account of the subject matter of practical reasons at all.
In deciding whether a certain claim is among one’s “considered judgments,” or in
24 For fuller discussion see Scanlon 2002. 25 Street 2006, p. 110.
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deciding whether to modify such a judgment in the light of its conﬂict with a principle
one has arrived at or whether, instead, to modify or abandon the principle in the light
of this conﬂict, the question one asks cannot be “Will this judgment be among those
I would arrive at if I reached reﬂective equilibrium?” but rather “Is this judgment
correct?” The process of seeking reﬂective equilibrium in one’s beliefs about a subject
matter is therefore not a characterization of the truth about that subject matter but
rather a method for arriving at such a characterization.
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